We consider high performance computing infrastructures consisting of multiple sites connected over a wide-area network. These sites house heterogeneous computing systems, network elements and local-area connections, and the wide-area network plays a critical, asymmetric role of providing the vital connectivity between them. We model this infrastructure as a recursive system of systems, wherein the basic systems at the finest levels are composed of discrete cyber and physical components. These components may be disabled by cyber and physical disruptions, and their reinforcements protect against them albeit at a cost. We utilize results from a game formulation based on (i) characterizing the disruptions between systems at each level of recursion using aggregate failure correlation functions, and within basic systems using the multiplier functions, and (ii) using utility functions expressed in terms of the number of basic system components attacked and reinforced. At Nash Equilibrium, we derive expressions for the expected capacity of the infrastructure given by the number of computing nodes that are operational and connected to the network.
INTRODUCTION
A Distributed High Performance Computing (HPC) infrastructure consists of supercomputer sites connected over a Wide-Area Network (WAN). The computing systems could be heterogeneous with custom computing nodes equipped with Graphical Processing Units (GPU), Multiple Integrated Core (MIC) systems, neuromorphic and other accelerators. They are housed in facilities with climate controls provided by Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) systems. These computing systems are connected via Local Area Network (LAN) switches to border routers, which are in turn connected to WAN via physical fibers. A distributed HPC infrastructure with N sites connected over WAN is shown in Figure 1 . The HVAC system consists of a physical cooling tower and a mobile app that controls its operations such as temperature settings. A successful operation of these infrastructures depends on complex interactions between various cyber and physical components, which can be disrupted by attacks or other incidental failures. Hence, the infrastructure providers are required to strategically reinforce the components by taking into account various cyber and physical parts and correlations among them.
The wide ranging complexities of site systems, in particular supercomputers, lead to correlations at multiple levels, which makes the existing approaches based on System of Systems (SoS) formulations [10] inadequate. We utilize the recent Recursive SoS (RSoS) formulations [9] to capture the multi-level correlations, wherein each system is recursively defined. The basic systems at (possibly different) finest levels are entirely composed of discrete cyber and physical components. This formulation enables the incorporation of different levels of details to match the varying complexities of sites. In particular, it generalizes the two-level characterizations in [7, 10] wherein all systems consist solely of cyber and physical components.
A variety of cyber and physical attacks can be launched on the components of such an infrastructure, and they can degrade its capacity, typically, measured by the total number of computing nodes available to users. The computing nodes are accessible to users over the network, which makes them vulnerable to cyber attacks. Physical attacks in the form of fiber cuts and cooling tower degradations represent different attack vectors that degrade this infrastructure; however, they require physical proximity access by attackers. In addition, incidental disruptions such as device failures may also propagate within and across systems at various levels. Component reinforcements may be put in place to protect against these attacks and incidental failures, including deploying specialpurpose firewalls, replicating routers in fail-over configurations, and installing redundant fiber lines to sites and between wide-area network router locations. While such reinforced components can survive direct attacks, computing nodes may still be unavailable to users due to propagative effects of attacks on other components [4] . For instance, even if the supercomputers at a site are hardened against cyber attacks, they can all be made unavailable, for example, by cutting the fiber connections to the site with physical attacks, or by bringing down the HVAC system by a single cyber attack on control app. Non-reinforced components, on the other hand, will be disabled by direct attacks. The reinforcements and attacks incur costs to the provider and attacker, respectively, and their corresponding benefits depend not only on the components but also on various correlations, due to the propagation of disruptions within the sites and between sites over the network.
An RSoS S used to model an HPC infrastructure [9] is either (i) a basic system composed of discrete cyber and physical components, or (ii) consists of N 1 level-1 systems S 1 i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N 1 , each of which itself is a recursively defined RSoS. By recursively expanding all non-basic systems, we reach the basic systems S i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N S . Let y i and x i denote the number of components of a basic system S i attacked and reinforced, respectively. For a nonbasic system S, let y S and x S represent the number of components attacked and reinforced, respectively, which are obtained by adding the corresponding values of its descendent basic systems. Let P I (S) denote the survival probability of a basic or non-basic system S = S k i at level k, and P I (S) denote the survival probability of entire RSoS S. The aggregate failure correlation function C k i is the failure probability of the "rest" of RSoS (namely, without S k i ) given the failure of S k i at level k. Intuitively, it indicates the relative importance of S k i by capturing the fault propagation from it to the rest of RSoS, which is denoted by S −S k i . In addition, correlations among the components are characterized by simple product-form, first-order differential conditions on P I (S i ) of basic system S i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N S using the system multiplier functions [8] .
We consider a game wherein individual system components can be disrupted by the attacker, and can be reinforced by the provider to defend against the attacks [7, 10] . The costs of attacks and reinforcements of basic systems are denoted by L A (y 1 , . . . , y N S ) and L D (x 1 , . . . , x N S ), respectively. The provider minimizes the utility function given by the sum of two parts:
where the first part corresponds to reward and the second part corresponds to cost. At Nash Equilibrium (NE), the attacker and provider minimize their respective utility functions [1] . The expected capacity of HPC infrastructure is the expected number of available computing nodes, given by
where n (i,c) is the number of computing nodes at site i, and P (i,c) is the survival probability of its computing system. In this paper, we utilize the definitions and NE conditions from earlier works [9] to obtain estimates of N I in terms of cost terms, correlation functions, system survival probabilities, and their partial derivatives.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we expand the HPC infrastructure model of [9] . In Section 3, we present system survival probabilities at NE from [9] and estimates for expected capacity. We present conclusions in Section 4.
DISTRIBUTED HPC INFRASTRUCTURE
A generic distributed HPC infrastructure shown in Figure 1 consists of N sites connected over a wide-area network, which is represented as system N + 1. Each HPC site houses a supercomputer of potentially different size and architecture, and its HVAC system is controlled by a mobile phone app. The computing system consists of a number of computing nodes connected over an interconnect, and each computing node may consist of a multi-core CPU and an accelerator such as GPU or MIC, as illustrated in Figure 2 . The HVAC system itself consists of a physical cooling tower and the app that controls the temperature settings. In addition, the network connectivity to the site is provided by optical fibers. At a coarse level, each site is modeled by four basic systems, two cyber systems, namely, computing system and HVAC app, and two physical systems, namely, network fiber and cooling tower, as shown in Figure 3 . At a finer level, each computing system can be decomposed into basic systems of computing nodes, each with CPU and GPU components. As systems, a site and network are structurally quite different and consist of different types of components, namely, computing and communications devices, respectively.
In general, an infrastructure S can be expanded into an RSoS tree by recursively expanding each non-basic system S 1 i into next level systems S 2 j 's, and so on. And for each non-basic system S, we can identify its descendant basic systems as the leaves of RSoS subtree rooted at S. Also, we identify the set of systems S k at each level k of the tree, which consist of basic and non-basic systems at that level. A coarse RSoS model of these sites connected over the network is represented by two systems at level 1, one representing all sites and the other representing the network, as shown in Figure 3 . At level 2, each site is represented as a non-basic system, and the network is represented by two basic systems that consist of its cyber and physical components, respectively. Then, at level 3, for each site we have two basic systems, namely, computing system and network fiber, and one non-basic system namely, the HVAC system, which is further refined to level 4 cooling tower and control app, as shown in Figure 3 .
At a site, the cyber system including its computer and the HVAC control app can be brought down by (different) cyber attacks, the HVAC cooling tower may be physically damaged, and the communications fibers that connect the sites may be physically cut. These attacks may render the computing system at the site unavailable by directly disabling it, for example, crashing it or manipulating the app to increase the temperature to trigger a shutdown, or by disconnecting it from the network by physically disconnecting the fiber. The communications network connects the sites, and each of its routers manages L N connections as shown in Figure 1 ; here, a cyber attack on a router will disconnect all its connections, i.e., Figure 4 : RSoS sub-tree of computing system at site k.
the L N sites, whereas a fiber attack may disconnect one or some of them.
To reinforce the components of this infrastructure, some nodes of supercomputers and routers may be replicated, and redundant fiber lines may be installed. For simplicity of discussion, all sites are considered to be of similar structure, and the heterogeneity of RSoS is illustrated by modeling the communications network and sites at different levels of detail. More detailed system models are possible to capture finer details of computing system and site network; for example, the sites could vary in size and types of computing systems, such as generic clusters or custom-designed supercomputers. Similarly, the network infrastructure system models can be expanded to include the facilities that house wide-area network routers, along with various cyber components and facility HVAC systems with physical components.
This infrastructure is modeled at a coarse level by an RSoS consisting of 3N systems at level 3 where S 3
, and S 3 (k,h) represent the computing system, fiber connection, and HVAC system, respectively, of site k. At level 2, , j = 1, 2, . . . , n (k,c) , each containing multi-core CPU and GPU components, as shown in Figure 4 . As in the previous case, there are two basic systems at level 2 corresponding to the network, and 2N basic systems at level 4 corresponding to HVAC system. Additionally, there are N basic systems at level 4 corresponding to the interconnects of computing systems at all sites, and a total of n (k,c) basic systems at level 5 that correspond to computing nodes. The components of basic systems in this expanded version are primarily subject to cyber disruptions since physical disruptions require access deep into the facilities, typically, racks that contain computing and interconnect components.
EXPECTED CAPACITY
Under the conditions of the asymmetric network and uncorrelated systems, and de-coupled reinforcement effects (see [7] for formal definitions), the correlation functions C k i at recursive level k and multiplier functions Λ b are used to characterize NE conditions. The estimatesP b;D andP b;D of the survival probability P I (S b ) of basic system S b expressed in terms of the product correlation function C b and product multiplier function Λ b , respectively, for b = 1, 2, . . . , N S , are given by [9] 
where S b is a basic system under condition:
G, L is the composite multiplier [7] . The system survival probability estimateP b;D of basic system S b provides qualitative information about the effects of various parameters including the aggregated correlation coefficient
G, L [7] . When applied directly to a RSoS S that consists of only basic systems S b (namely, with 0 level of recursion, or m b = 0), this estimate provides a simpler expression derived for SoS than in [5] 
The added generality of the recursive formulation of RSoS still preserves the basic form of the estimateP b;D valid for the simpler SoS formulation, albeit under the expanded definitions of product aggregate correlation and multiplier functions.
Consider the computing system at site k, i.e., b = (k, c). The survival probability of the computing system at site k is given bŷ
Since the term Λ (k,c) appears in the denominator ofP (k,c);D ,P (k,c);D decreases with the number of cyber attacks y (k,c) , and increases [y (k,a) − x (k,a) ] + which are the numbers of attacks exceeding the reinforcements on fiber, HVAC cooling tower, and HVAC control app, respectively. The latter condition may appear counter-intuitive at the surface but note that it only characterizes the states that satisfy NE conditions.
Since the expected capacity of the HPC infrastructure is given by
where n (k,c) is the number of computing nodes at site k, its estimate is given byN
Thus, we have the estimatê
, and
. Applying the condition that the failure of the computation components of different sites are uncorrelated and the asymmetric network condition [5, 6] , we have
= 0, and C 3 (k,c)
= 0 for k = 1, . . . , N . Hence, we have ∆ (k,c ) = 1 and C (k,c ) = 0, and the expected capacity of the HPC infrastructure is given bŷ
, and C 3 (k,c)
for k = 1, . . . , N are constants, their partial derivatives with respect to x (k,c) could be non-zero, as other parameters change to keep them constant. The equation indicates that higher survival probability of each site and all the sites together leads to lower expected computation capacity of the HPC infrastructure, since
∂x (k,c ) and
should be non-negative. The effects of attack and defense of the fiber and HVAC system on the expected computation capacity are captured by the Λ (k,c) term in the denominator. Since
, we have
, then the effects of attack and defense of the fiber and HVAC system on the expected computation capacity are similar to those on the survival probability of a site discussed before, for instance, the capacity decreases with the number of cyber attacks y (k,c) , and increases with [y (k,p) −x (k,p) ] + , [y (k,t ) −x (k,t ) ] + , and [y (k,a) −x (k,a) ] + . These observations may appear counter-intuitive at the surface but note that they only characterize the states that satisfy NE conditions. The above expected capacity N I of HPC infrastructure is based on counting the number of computing nodes at various sites based on the coarse RSoS model. It can be defined to reflect the number of CPU cores or GPU cores by suitably refining the basic computing system S 3 (k,c) into n (k,c) nodes. Let n (k,c,p j ,cpu) and n (k,c,p j ,дpu) denote the number of CPU and GPU cores of the computing node S 5 (k,c,p j )
, j = 1, 2, . . . , n (k,c) . Then the expected number of number of CPU cores is given by
where P (k,c, j) = P I S 3 . Using the refined RSoS model shown in Figure 4 , we obtain
Then, using the next level of refinement, we obtain
Similarly, the expected number of GPU cores is given by
Then, the estimatesN cpu I andN дpu I can be obtained as above using the corresponding product multiplier and product aggregate correlation functions.
CONCLUSIONS
We consider a class of infrastructures with HPC sites connected over a wide-area network. By utilizing correlations at system-and component-level, we consider a formulation of ensuring the infrastructure survival as a game between an attacker and a provider, by using composite utility functions [7, 10] . We utilized the survival probability estimates at NE from previous works [9] to provide compact expressions for the expected capacity given by the number of operational and accessible computing nodes. They provide insightful information about the dependence of capacity on cost and correlation parameters as well as the number of reinforced and attacked components. In particular, by employing sub-models of sites, effects of parts of the system on the expected capacity can be inferred. Such inferences can be extended to individual components of the sites; for example, it can be inferred that reinforcement of HVAC app nullifies the amplification effect due to co-location of the servers at sites. These results are obtained by applying the extensions of previous results on interconnected systems [2, 3] and cyber-physical infrastructures [11] to the multi-site HPC infrastructure. In particular, the RSoS formulation of [9] is expanded to HPC infrastructure by taking into account the details of computing systems and the asymmetric aspects of the network connectivity.
The RSOS models presented here can be further refined by taking finer details into account such as the specifics of interconnects. In particular, performance studies of our approach using more detailed models of HPC infrastructure would be of future interest. The formulation of this paper may be extended to include cases where targeted attacks and reinforcements of specific individual components are explicitly represented. It is of future interest to compare this formulation to ones whose utility functions explicitly utilize the capacity term in place of infrastructure survival probability terms. Another future direction is to consider the simultaneous cyber and physical attacks on multiple systems and components, and sequential game formulations of this problem.
